
January 10, 2012
High Court Reverses Conviction in Killings
By ADAM LIPTAK
WASHINGTON — The Supreme Court on Tuesday reversed the conviction of a
New Orleans man, saying prosecutors there had withheld important
evidence that his lawyers could have used in his defense.
The decision, by an 8-to-1 vote, was the latest in a series of Supreme
Court decisions suggesting a pattern of prosecutorial misconduct in the
Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office. Justice Clarence Thomas
dissented.
Tuesday’s case concerned Juan Smith, who was convicted of killing five
people in 1995, when a group of men burst into a house in search of
money and drugs. They ordered the occupants to lie down and opened fire.
Mr. Smith was the only person tried for the killings. He was convicted
based solely on the eyewitness testimony of a survivor, Larry Boatner.
Prosecutors presented no DNA, fingerprints, weapons or other physical
evidence.
But Mr. Boatner’s testimony proved sufficient.
“He’s right there,” Mr. Boatner said at Mr. Smith’s trial, pointing at
the defendant. “I’ll never forget him.”
It later emerged that prosecutors had failed to disclose reports of
interviews with Mr. Boatner. In one, hours after the killings, Mr.
Boatner said he could not describe the intruders except to say they
were black men. Five days later, he said he had not seen the intruders’
faces and could not identify them.
Eyewitness evidence, according to recent studies and court decisions,
is both unusually persuasive and unusually unreliable. Kannon K.
Shanmugam, a lawyer with William & Connolly who represented Mr.
Smith in the Supreme Court, told the justices in a brief that the
withheld statements from Mr. Boatner “constitute the epitome of
impeachment evidence.”
There was no question, Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. wrote for the
majority, that the reports should have been turned over under Brady v.
Maryland, a 1963 Supreme Court decision that requires prosecutors to
provide favorable evidence to the defense. The question for the
justices was only whether the failure mattered — that is, in the words
of a 2009 decision, whether “there is a reasonable probability that,
had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.”
In a brisk four-page opinion in the case, Smith v. Cain, No. 10-8145,
Chief Justice Roberts wrote that “Boatner’s undisclosed statements were
plainly material.”
Prosecutors and Justice Thomas gave various reasons why the jury might
have discounted the statements, including that Mr. Boatner was under
stress and feared retaliation. Chief Justice Roberts dismissed the
arguments as speculation and said the fact that the jury might have
disbelieved the statements “gives us no confidence that it would have
done so.”
The current district attorney, Leon Cannizzaro, said his office “will
file a motion in this quintuple murder case to set it for trial within
the next 60 days.”
Justice Thomas’s dissent, at 19 pages, was almost five times as long as
the majority opinion. “The question presented here is not whether a
prudent prosecutor should have disclosed the information that Smith
identifies,” Justice Thomas wrote.
Rather, he wrote, the question was whether Mr. Smith had not shown a
reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a different
conclusion had it known of the undisclosed statements. Justice Thomas
said a careful review of the balance of the evidence demonstrated that
nothing would have changed.
The district attorney’s office has a history of inattention to the
requirements of the Brady decision. The Orleans Public Defender’s
Office, in a brief supporting Mr. Smith, said that 28 convictions
obtained by the district attorney’s office were later ruled to have
been tainted by Brady violations. The district attorney’s office said
in its own brief that the correct number was 13.
Last March, in a 5-to-4 decision, the Supreme Court wiped out a $14
million award to John Thompson, a former death row inmate who was
exonerated after 18 years when withheld evidence came to light.
Justice Thomas wrote the majority opinion in that decision, which
divided along ideological lines. While he said prosecutors there had
violated their duty to see justice done, he wrote that Mr. Thompson
could not sue the office on the theory that it had failed to train its
prosecutors.
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